Information policy for change
ecent economic history -hyperexpansive economic
policy during the first term of President Pérez, devaluation as of 1983,
recession at the end of the aforementioned decade and subsequently as of 1992,
economic adjustment programs during 1989, and miscellaneous economic organization
programs during the second term of President Caldera, all indicate that
public opinion was not adequately prepared to receive and understand the intended or
implemented changes.
Although economic structures, policies and actions are the factors that condition
the communicational process, it is also true that a communicational strategy that may
provide support to any change in economic policy can help to ensure that it is
perceived, understood and eventually accepted by
certain public sectors or common interest groups.
In times of great skepticism and confusion due to mishandling of economic
policy, due to the lack of coherence and continuous disagreement observed among the
members of the economic Cabinet, President Rafael Caldera delivered a
long-awaited speech to the country, announcing measures that implied a clear break
from the majority of prior measures that were in effect at the date.
We are reminded of a new version of the NPE, the new economic policy
established by Lenin, which he was forced to change and turnover, justifying
the strategy of one step forward and two steps back. However, in this case, the intention
is to take steps forward, toward the modernization of the Venezuelan economy, in
agreement with other world economies, without looking back.
The problem - without considering the implicit benefits of the
announced measures and those solely implied- that President Caldera
assumed to resolve was credibility, that is, the lack of the required credibility
in local and foreign markets regarding the Venezuelan economy.
If the opinion climate is not modified for generating trust in the countryþs
economy, the adjustment measures will be useless. Furthermore, it would be
misleading to aim at instilling credibility without an adequate, coherent and integral
group of economic policies and measures.
It is assumed that the credibility of communication is mainly based on the source
or issuer of the message. The communicatorþs main problem is to convince his
audience to accept the content of the message he transmits. In their book
Communication and Persuasion (Yale University Press, 1968), Carl L.
Hovland, Irving L. Janis and Harold H. Kelley state that the individualþs disposition to
accept the conclusions proposed by a communicator will partly depend on his
perception of the aforementioned communicator, how informed and intelligent he
seems, or which are his intentions.
In his speech, which marked a significant change in economic policy, President
Caldera announced the new economic measures in a direct and explicit
manner, and tried to provide a balanced argumentative basis for these policies
presenting both their costs and benefits for the population. Some politicians expected
him to profess a mea culpa . Actually, this would not have added any
credibility, since the hardships to be imposed on the population by the announced
measures were self-evident.
A few days before the presidential announcement, when Cordiplan Minister
Teodoro Petkoff was questioned by journalists on the lack of credibility, constant
incoherence, false starts and fictional announcements, he responded that actions would
speak louder than words. He also stated that the Presidentþs announcement of the
most relevant aspects of the new economic turning point ensured the recovery of our
economic policyþs long-lost credibility.
Although the presidential speech implied a break from previous discourse -and
certainly with the economic schemes and plans formerly executed or in progress- the
truth is that a major portion of the media had insisted on the need of adopting
economic measures generally qualified as orthodox. Therefore, the was a favorable
opinion climate for decision-making, in order to the course of the economy.
Obviously, some of the commentarists and columnists that contribute to the
formation of opinion trends will now oppose the very same measures previously
defended by them. However, this poses a risk to their own credibility as change
guides.
Curiously, some of the measures proposed in the media by columnists and
interviewers of different sectors, had already been announced in the first plan presented
by Minister Asdrúbal Baptista, but were not implemented. One of these measures was
the petroleum industry opening, which included the sale of shares for payment of
employee severance benefits of Government workers.
The announcement of the application of severe measures, implying heavy
adjustments for family economy, normally generates variable degrees of rejection
among the population. Minimizing criticism, providing explanations for the reasons and
ensuring that same are accepted, all are proof of the effectiveness of the discourse and
its credibility. Of course, communicational effectiveness is always relative, and never
absolute, as stated by James Paul Yarbrough in his book A Model for the Analysis
of Receiver Responses to Communication (Iowa State University, 1968).
In an environment plagued by mistrust and adverse reactions in financial and
economic media, communicational effectiveness and the level of credibility depend on
the generation of favorable expectations, as well as changes in attitude and opinion.
Once the measures are announced, their application is the element that will ensure
agreement with the proposals, thus reinforcing credibility.
On the day after the Presidential speech of April 15, PDVSA financed a
moderate campaign to justify the fairness of the gasoline price increase. And as
opposed to the events of 1989, there were no immediate or subsequent public uprisings.
Evidently, this does not whole eliminate the possibility of violent protest for different
reasons; however, at least we can affirm that no massive conflict was generated by the
announcement of the new policies and changes in economic course.
As the economic program progresses, other fundamental decisions will
necessarily be required in order to ensure the middle and long-term consolidation of the
program, as well as to commence a basic reform in the judicial system and the complete
transformation of the educational system.
The costs to be incurred by failing to implement these measures jeopardizes the
economic programþs credibility.
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