Comunidad VA 2

Julia Barragán

The normative power of self-exceptions

hen any member of the society violates a juridical norm, generally he sets in motion a gear that would entail restoring things to their original state of equilibrium. In order to attain this, sanctions are used as a tool to punish offenders in a manner that is directly proportional to the enormity or gravity of the violated norm.

There do occur situations that particularly grieve society and are as such considered as collective tragedies. In such cases, it would seem that juridical and social answers tend to be deeper and more profound. This is more so as such infringements tend to look more like veritable threats to the viability of the group. In those cases the authors of such violations, save for a few exceptions' tend to view their conducts as of a marginal character. Even if they manage to minimizes the amount of the sanction by displaying an attenuating conduct or even by proffering a justifiable explanation, the idea of living within a social framework that has been dented by them generally does not leave them unfettered. This feeling is also stared by the rest of society even where this does not mean assuming specific discriminatory attitudes or isolating the offenders.

There are other kinds of defiant behavior which do not entail such a drastic profile and therefore do not constitute any superlative danger to collective existence. Those are often considered as marginal within the context of collective welfare. Although this category do not receive the same feeling of repulsion as described earlier, they nevertheless attract condemnation without hesitation, not only from the juridical point of view, but also at a social level. In bow cases however the fact than an actor had incurred a fault and continues committing faults does not mean that he is unconscious of the distance between his conduct and accepted normative marks of reference.

On the contrary, with the so called "self exceptions" occur something particularly curious. Generally, these are "small exception" that like water flowing through rocks, gets filtered in an overlapping manner, succeeds in percolating through the very basic soil foundation. In these cases, the actor is not only way apart from the juridical or social order, but he finds enough temerity to justify his attitude and even dare to lend it legitimacy. He is almost proposing a new framework of legitimacy and consequently a new mark of normative reference. The most surprising aspect of these cases is that the self exception conjures an enormous power of attraction and even those who do not practice them are inclined toward not openly condemning them and end up tolerating them tacitly.

The purpose of this study is to show the highly erosive character constituted against the collective relations where self exception tendencies are exhibited. Furthermore, the paper tries to shed light on the great normative power which insensible and unwitting consolidation of dis-social conducts could have on the collective interests.

A brief history of disillusion

The village is beautiful. It harmoniously lies in a protected and shady mount surrounding. Graciously, sunny mountains shelter its with its slopes having deep marks of nature's work wrought through several centuries. Vines grow up while smokes could be seen ascending out of some solid stone houses and the orchards ever remain green. As for the villagers, they go through a blissful cycle of dreams not lacking water, pruning, fruits vintages nor musts.

The very old people are still reminiscent of how it was long ago; on the Village Patron Saint's Day. It was a feeling of what seemed like an admixture of pagan exhalation with influence and rustic merriment that leads everybody to the village square: men and women, old and young and children all in their most adorned country dresses. They all lived together in this unusual way, but genuine serenity of rural life, devoid ill feeling. From early in the morning, the square gets meticulously cleaned; its pavements which have seen several centuries get shined in deep-wet gray. Like treasure hunters, neither, kids impose on themselves rather reverently and silently to ensuring that not a leaf piece of stick remain littered, and with heroic pride announce with joy the discovery of any. Several men and women were in charge of garlands. For their part, the women engaged in trying to keep the multi-colored papers for the garlands in the proper chromatic sequence without entangling them in the ropes that supported them. They have to handle them carefully. The men took their tasks on top the ladders, completing the supports, pillars, checking the quality of knots and other structures. Men and women exchanged with one another, suggestions, orders and advises and the echoes of laughter open beam through the air, at times with the risk of a twist at the top of the ladder. Also doors and windows of housing surrounding the square became turned into objects of decorative delight. (garlands and braided paper competed with other items that offered a silhouette, along with bells, globes and some fruits hung around. When the tasks were finished participants led the scene proud, animated, turning back occasionally to see from the different angels the ellect of their work on the square.

By mid-afternoon, one or two carts arrived carrying a big empty barrel and several booths. A member of young people, undoubtedly more than are required, also arrive and begin to set up this container right in the center of the square, on the support which has been provided. With a feeling fulfillment and indeed pride, they make sure that the big wooden cork adjusted correctly and if the faucets opened and closed properly. Booths were also set up appropriately. Once the young people had finished their tasks, they went away in their carts, leaving the afternoon open for the stale of their rather noisy celebration.

In a formal sense, the festivities started at the end of the day. This is notwithstanding the fact that the preparations went on through-out the day. From nearby and not so close places families started to arrive, following the same ritual. That is women displaying in the booths, trays with sweet aroma of meal. removing the immaculately white linens cloth spread over them. Examining with critical eyes, they put in last minute aesthetic touches. Meanwhile, the men from the various families went to the barrel, uncovered it and ceremoniously began to pour several liters of their bust wine contained in various vessels.

During the succeeding excitement grew fast, especially propelled and stimulated by the good food! good drink. sweet talks and songs. Above all, every participant fait a deep contentment that it was worth the while to have been together, sharing culinary secrets treasured by neighboring families. Especially they delighted in the communal olfaction in the air and the palate with the marvel provided by the seeming magic mix of the best of the sun, the land winestock and wine press. Moreover. coming as it did, all at once aster the toil and hard labor of one whole year. They also felt fulfilled that it made sense to have worked assiduously and contributed time, effort and goods in preparing for the celebrations, because the occasion repaid multiples of dividends. It also helped them cherish the fact that nothing could be done well without the help of others. Neither cleMing nor decorating, not making of booths. Similarly neither the process of preparing food, nor barrel, nor wine could match the spirit of the celebration. Very late in the night, happy, but fatigued, the villagers returned to their homes deeply enlivened and in some sense also in melancholy over the end of the event. As the time passed by, it become obvious the villages's festivity, though in a kind of parenthesis, constituted a medium for putting away strife and grudges. It also served as an escape valve through which several symbolic tensions within society were defused. Furthermore, it also offered an excellent setting for re-enacting bonds of brothership and love.

Nobody exactly recalls how it happened, nor when everything started. Neither do anyone remember who was the first, but then something happened. Perhaps it was the villager who missed a slight resentment because by his estimation his efforts toward the preparation of the party were not valued commensurately by other. In another sense, it could have been the handiwork of someone who was once quite famous and well admired for his efficiency and sense of rationality in the management of resources. Still yet, it could have been somebody who been ill had lost the pleasure of good wine or yet still the machinations of a widow who for some time hurl lost the. pleasure of attention and good company of others. There is also the possibility of tracing it to some one who had resolves to leave the village and move out to a different location. All these notwithstanding and the time it occulted being irrelevant, the fact of interest was that someone, somewhere in time began to introduce sub standard wine. Believing that this conduct may never be discovered in a barrel full of excellent wine from other, year after year, this continued. As it would seem this practice began to percolate among the people and at a time assumed a more generalized dimension. But one day as the faucet was opened, it became transparent that was stream out were virtually mere water 2.

Today some people still remember that unfortunate night and their perplexity gets mixed with despair, disappointment and nervousness. But as expected, from the moment events turned soured, a number of explanations wore tendered; each one at variance with others. Those "others", being responsible for the failure of everybody's party and thereby became black spotted as enemies. The Village Festivity was over!

The ill fated night when the rueful discovery occurred was naturally followed by unhappy. Imputations, pointed finger and denials were made towards another. What was more is that the village nearly became totally denigrated to a parley for the settlement of strife, enmity and open hostilities between individuals. Older people charged on younger ones young ones accused the old for the state of affairs, etc. Some on their part talked continuous about old injustices which served to justify already unjustifiable situations and reasoning. Some people even maintained that the best thin to do was to leave every thing as it was already was ! This meant that everyone to drink his own wine and arrange on ways to have his own fun. But curiously in spite of those developments, it was evident and undeniable that each and every one had a part to blame. Although among each group of "talkers", justifiable reasons for self exoneration from the fraud could be heard. However, it was obvious from the fact of the continual sessions of "talking" about the vents, even if only for the sake of reciprocal recrimination, that there existed a strong will to turn back the road that led them to this rueful situation. Even though for every one it was "the other" that was first responsible for the parlous state of affairs. Who knows, probably the first person was already dead or for a long time changed location to live somewhere far away from the village. Probably he is living in a better village and drinking a good wine.

Everybody enjoys a good wine!!!

The episode which occurred in the village happens quite frequently in the course of social interaction. Such behavior patterns that ended up in the much undesirable results we have seen, also do exist in our daily lives. For instance, the hurrying lady who parks her car "just for a while" in front of a hydrant, self-convinced that she is not causing a damage to anybody. Not too dissimilar is the gentleman who cuts down a tree in order to create a new space in the sidewalk to accommodate a new car in his family, after all "never mind it is too old". Not better still is the charming young lady, smiling towards a queue of people waiting for attention and asking for "permission to make a short enquiry" which ends up as a complex consultation that itself requires a "quick procedure" 3. All those shades of attitude have certain common elements. On the one hand, certain individuals exists the desire to receive benefits through "a small exception to the rule". On the other hand such an exception is deemed so small that it will not harm a world order in which every other person is respectful. The person so exempted sincerely does not believe that he is inflicting a grievous injury on someone else. This beneficiary of the exemption has always justifiable reasons to explain and justify not only to himself but often even to other his demeanor.

The consequences of those behavioral patterns are felt at two levels. On the one hand, such people make nothing of the social efficiency, along with other things, all adding up to attenuate public welfare. On the other hand, these people create an environment for reciprocal misgiving, that usually weakens the consistency of collective interest. Each one of these consequences create avenues trough which special kinds of problems arise.These in themselves dictate specific approaches for resolving.
As it pertains to the first kind of problem, it is more or less evident that self excepting behavior, on the part of society's members always some immediate consequences, mostly in the form of diminution of the scope and quality of public welfare. As could have been noticed in the case of the villagers wine or the impossibly to have access to the hydrant at a time of emergency, or more still, precarious impact of deforestation in a suburban setting. In all these instances, collective will in all its entirety and at the level of constituents parts, was sacrificed. This produced discomforts and disaffections. Some people maintain that flexibility for the sake of "small exceptions and transgression" contribute to make more bearable such inconveniences. This goes on without noticing that the origin of those ones are found in other "small exception" before them.

The solution to these kind of problems at first instance seem more or less simple. It can be conceived that behavior tending to harm collective resources should sanctions which would reduce their occurrence to the barest minimum. But in order to successfully attain this objective, sanctions would need to fulfill two conditions. First of all they should be severe enough to constitute a loss that surpasses the benefit eventually derivable from the "small exception or default". Second, there should exist a high probability that such sanctions are to be consistently and effectively applied to all defaulters.
Being: e Cases in which a determined individual uses a "small exception default" U(e) Benefits derived by such individuals in case e S Established sanctions for case e D(s) Scanty benefit (or non benefit) produced by the established sanction for case e P(s) Probability of an effective application of the established sanction for case e

The relation should be: U(e)

When a social group establishes sanctions in which a strong or hard punishment is foreseen for people using "small exceptions or defaults", but the probability exists that the effective of such sanctions is very low, the relation indicated above will never be satisfied. This relation makes it evident that procedures which tend towards application of nones are as important as their content.

Social practices may generate two kinds of deferring answers when confronting small exception or defaults. Whilst some human groups generally refuse to accept them and under certain circumstances may become excessively rigid and insensible, others tend to be extremely flexible, so exceptions become rules with rather severe consequences for long term social fabric. Societies where the first kind of answer is prevalent usually offer an environment that could be easily foreseen. Where adequate measures are to be taken in order to avoid these small exceptions, since people would rely on them. In groups where social language is based on the second kind of answer, the realm for forecast is low and unexpected problems can surface at any moment. The solution to such problems would also tend to be aleatory. Of course, it is only in the groups which assume the first kind of social practice that the basic relations would make it possible to solve problems arising from small exceptions and defaults.

In spite of the apparent simplicity of the relations already treated to put them to practice presupposes a number of difficulties which seem significant. In our example, villagers could prove this when some time after the unfortunate night people were calm enough to think of possible ways out. After long and complicated discussions, a plethora of ideas were weighed on the scale and the villagers eventually agreed that the origin of the problem was the lack of control in the quality of contributions made by individuals. In order to mend this deficiency, they agreed on establishing aleatory verification of the wine by three tasters. Of course, these were the best in the whole surrounding and had the responsibility to accept or refuse the wine before it was poured into the barrel. At random three out of ten contributors were so tested. In cases where there was a rejection, in addition to the social reproof that was generated, sanctions were imposed on the culprits, who obviously wanted to defraud the common interest and obtain undue advantages.

Then the first problem that arose was the yardstick for electing the best and tasting senses. Since it was assumed that such experts were very good, their superiority vis-a-vis other eligible candidates could only be based on rather vague criteria. By and large, three names were eventually elected by the majority.

In spite of its ostensible simplicity, the task was hard to accomplish. The attribute of being excellent tasters did not mean they were completely inflexible, intolerant and of impeachable sentiments. Besides, they had a good level of information about the generality of village life. They were therefore challenged with the task of rejecting wine of inferior quality, imposing sanctions on say a good peer who had just passed through a year of difficulties. How would they reject for instance a new neighbor's wine, when he had come to the festival full of spirit and expectancy or even for the first time?... But then the cases multiplied and how to handle such conditions and people began to speak, quite loudly about discriminations and favoritism. The way out was thought to be guardians or putting checks on the tasters and making them responsible for their decisions. New set of sanctions were then established, this time for the tasters who may found to have compromise the honorable discharge of their duties. All these on the short run contributed to the improvement of the quality of the wine, as compared with the unfortunate night when things tuned sour. Yet still, the village festival could not still recover the lost spirit of collective and cooperative enterprise. Some people were no doubt in a good mood, but others largely acted under the coercive threat of sanctions hanging on them. In pouring the good wine, they felt obliged to comply and not with a motive to share in the communal gaiety. Thus they tried not to go the extra mile in overindulging their generosity. Many of them nursed skepticism, as to whether some neighbor was not as pious and thereby was obtaining some personal advantages. The suspicions also loomed large, if say friendship or somewhat familiar relations with the tasters could not temper the random selection of families form wine verification.

From the event happened in the village, it could be inferred that to keep the relation (I) as impartially effective as possible in a collectively desirable sense, it was essential to put in place the force and sanction that was applicable and appropriate. This suppose a continuous task of detection and fortification of the number of aspects that have the tendency of being vulnerable. On the other hand, it is clear that even if such relations make almost unprofitable the intention of fraud against welfare such relations can only grant an increasing quantity and quality of public benefit. But then, it is not in a condition of granting, nor promoting its standard of cooperative behavior among group members. As would be explained in greater details later, this in itself constitute another set of problems.

Just good wine is not enough

Just by itself, the sanction system is unable to promote cooperation in a social - environment. This is due to the fact that relations that spring up under this framework, find an evaluation that is exclusively computed on profit and loss matrix. In this context it is natural at individuals, contributed the wine with the minimum quality; just good enough to scale over the hurdle of being tasted. It seemed neither strange that some people, psychologically speaking, even dared the risk of contributing wine with a very bad quality, hoping that it would escape the scrutiny of the tasters. For instance, it would not be surprising if a person, deliberately contributed poor quality wine, believing that his charm, charisma, prestige or even age could make the umpires consider any likely incrimination as "small exception". And we have earlier said that it is natural for this to happen because any of such behavioral paradigms increases the individualistic benefit which accrues to the recipients.

It is germane to recognize here that the solution based on appropriate application of sanction system, besides promoting growth in specific collective interest also has the potential of making evident a real general interest for stimulating behaviors that are based on reciprocal confidence. From this point of view, sanctions, besides discouragement of fraudulent behaviors through benefits/loss computation expressed in (I) it makes public a normative message in which the content surpasses the immediate profit margins to project itself towards a constructive way of life. But such a message lacks necessary autonomy and specificity to restore by itself the language lost in our village.
Villagers in our story felt that recuperating the quality of the wine constituted an important goal its attainment the sanction system had contributed a lot, but at the same time they perceived that its essential objective was deeper and it consisted in restoring the language almost lost. Such language had been possible in its moment, starting from some basic rules as respecting acquired engagements, reciprocal confidence and equity in treating individual group members.

The dissatisfaction among villagers in spite of having in place a great improvement in the quality of the wine makes it clearly evident that two kinds of problems are always generated when individual interests are maximized at the expense of the collective interest. First, there occurs a decrees in the quantity and quality of public services which at the same time has a corollary effect in overall efficiency in all of society action. On the other hand, as mentioned already, such patterns of behavior at first create within the collectivity a feeling of frustration but afterwards such defiant conduct get incorporated insensibly to the repertory of accepted norms of the whole. They end up constituting their own social language . From the village example which we have amply considered, it could be deduced that solving the first problem does not mean a palliation for the second one.

As a matter of fact, a solution founded on the development of an articulated system of sanctions only pays tangential and marginal attention to the latter problem. No doubt it attacks with a high degree of efficacy the first problem. However, its worth is extremely weak and indeed not directed at steady solution to the more fundamental problems of recasting a new social language. For this reason it becomes improbable that a long term improvement in the quantity and quality of public welfare could be achieved with just a resort to a system of controls giving teeth by sanctions. From the individual point of view, there are always people who are disposed to overrunning controls and sanctions, of course with the expectation of getting additional benefits. On the contrary, it is highly probable that such consequences as experimented in our village from the time of that unfortunate night would likely repeat itself; even with the watchful eyes of the tasters. As it is known, through the vulnerability of inherent imperfection of human beings and human systems all controls can be ridiculed and sanctions cleverly evaded. The construction of a language of cooperation is therefore a much harder and slower task than establishing a control system along side its respective sanctions. But clearly the language of cooperation is the only rewarding mechanism that is able to reinforce the stability or relation in (1). In consequence the language of cooperation is also the only viable mediatory condition to maintain in the long term quality and efficiency of social welfare.

The language of social cooperation just like any other language should not be constructed as a simple medium or vehicle for expressing reality or ideas which are independent of proper communication. Rather it should be seen as a constructive and advisory element of what has been expressed. From this perspective it would not be necessary to wait for the existence of a previous and concisely developed society founded on the basis of social cooperation to apply the language of cooperation. Instead the formation and conscious application of such language of cooperation will contribute in a parallel manner to the construction of the social basis of cooperation.

To unchain the construction process of language it is only necessary to have a primary element that is common to all human beings and human society -the existence of expectation-. In fact, if there is something always present in men even in their lowest evolutionary stages it is their capability to foresee the possible occurrence of certain determined events. Even in cases where man is far from being able to formalize this he is always capable of constructing a vision of possible situations and knows how probable such expectations are in reality. Both the images and the evolution of language are intrinsically related with the system of expectation and with the transformation to which it is subjected during the processes of development.

Together with expectation language by means of interaction exchange gets modified and gradually incorporates diverse elements that have been at the origin of communication itself. In their dynamic features language and communication are not just media of expression but become inducing factor for transforming various processes. Exchange serves to activate the understanding of existing problems, to stimulate the construction of new problems and to generate modification in shared system of expectation.

In the case of our village it is not strange therefore that after unfortunate night, in this particular manner, collective expectation became directed at the search for a platform on which the problem of wine could be solved. Since everybody remembered that many years ago, before the disagreeable experience, the taste of the wine drunk during the festival tasted good, it was not surprising that their interaction and exchanges revolved around such preoccupation. But then interaction would go far in producing a transformation in expectations The villagers did not only hope that in the festival a good wine could be consumed but they reactivated the expectation of making the village a place of joy during its patrons saints day.

The Language of cooperation

The language of cooperation that seems to have existed some time in our village and which is also associated with fresh expectation of attaining more worth that just a good wine, in the first time is characterized by the existence of a collective disposition of members. This is anchored on the craving to use joint strategies to solve the problems of a common group. Considering that such measures are able to make more useful individual effort being applied in isolation, towards the public welfare. In the second place, members of the collective whole expect from the use of such joint strategies the accruement of individual benefits which could be quantified as equitable; in line with ones contributions and of course necessities. Finally, they recognize that the deployment of joint strategies means working towards the attainment of highest benefits which they could all contribute to, since a part of such benefit could be kept in the public wealth. In other words the expectation of obtaining maximum dividends at the individual levels is expressed within the context of the language of cooperation with obvious expectation of reaping maximum benefits to the social collectivity and, of course reasonable and equitable individual one.

All this sounds exceptionally attractive, the older villagers have experience that such expectations are not completely new. On the contrary they have existed even for many years when the festival was a collective venture and the wine was excellent. That fact shows that the sole existence of expectation is not sufficient guarantee to become incorporation once and for ever into a communication system which is accepted by all members of the groups.

Up to this point, to continue further in the search of "something else than a good wine" it would not only be useful but necessary to take an inventory of some of the factors which have played a conspiratory role against the expectation of consideration the festival as a desirable collective enterprise. Alter all, this is what culminated in the denigration not only of the wine but of the festival itself.

The first identifiable factor states that for several reasons the mutual benefit produced by collectivity became marginal to the extent that it became seldom appetizing. Probably younger generation could not fully appreciate the fun offered by the festival in the same manner as the elders. For instance, very close to the village, disco tech which is strong up call for a more noisy and exuberant entertainment. The young people therefore seem to have thought that their time was better invested and expended in those places than in such patronal festivals. At the same time, new meeting places such as clubs and resorts offered wide and more captivating opportunity to adventures, dialogue and interpersonal interaction. Naturally, without much mutual benefit to be derived, it was difficult to maintain the language of cooperation and even more difficult to rebuild it.

Another factor which appears somewhat to be related to the first one, but by itself more profound is the subject of equitable allocation of desirable mutual benefits. It was evident that such festivals produced a higher benefit in recreation for the older people, but the question is, who invested the needed time and resources towards it success? Of course, the younger ones.

Furthermore, it is also useful to mention the cases of small families which appears to have been accorded little attention. They consume less than brought while numerous other families who contributed less merely consumed. Of course, those slops that affected equity in the distribution and allocation of benefit were insensibly affecting and modifying the expectation of different groups and members of the collectivity. At a point, as would be expected, some eventually reasoned that it was not worth the wile to continue with language of cooperation.

A less important factor came from those who carefully computed the value of their contributions in terms of true market conditions. After weighing this, they decided on replacing them with less expensive ones. So this people enjoyed a reasonable wine brought by others at the festival but deep down carried a healing smile of self fulfillment over their smart attitude. As virtually all the villagers were somehow smart, sooner or later, one after the other they started falling into the same temptation of making their own cost-benefit analysis in the same market terms. This factor in a way also conspires against the language of cooperation as villagers ended up, individually, applying the sane disarticulating and divisive strategy instead of using a common strategy which tends strengthen the language of cooperation.

The above characteristic elements that militate against the creation of cooperative communication could remarkable help us to establish which factor are capable to favor the formation and development of the language of cooperation. These are:

i there must exist a generalized expectation of efficiency as it relates to the generation and management of common-pool resources
ii there must exist also a generalized expectation of promoting a society which is founded on the need of developing joint strategies which may be useful in cultivating collective dividend.
iii common facilities and services as well as benefits which are generated through these joint efforts strategies should be equitable allocated.
iv the use of individual strategies which appear inimical to society joint strategy must be eliminated instinctively.

Conditions (iii) and (iv) above tend to receive their most important strength from normative values of juridical nature. Although, for such norms to quality satisfactorily their correctory mission, it would be necessary from the outset to resolve certain problems, not always trivial. As a matter of fact, it will be necessary to consider what constitute an equitable allocation or distribution under different social circumstances and when it could be categorically stated that an individual approach or strategy constitute fraudulent intent as it pertains to the joint strategy. From this point of view, the strength of(iii) and (iv) cannot come from a positive normative pedestal that only supports its strength based on a power of sanctions. But conversely, from a system of regulations oriented and tailored towards the attainment of equitable solution and directed at the stimulation of joint stategies 8 . As it pertains to the production of social benefit perhaps a body of norms with a strong and solid system of sanctions could be enough. But if the intention and the aspiration is to construct and develop a language of cooperation, positive regulations must be made to transmit unequivocal normative values.

On the other hand, conditions (i) and (ii) are closely related to social practice. On the one hand, expectations are usually derived from collective experience but on the other also from the reflections made by the group about such experiences. Within the frame work of social practice, solving a problem implies not just the material activities that had made it possible but the intellectual rationalization of the problem and the solutions that were chosen accordingly. In the process of tackling problems as well as in the development of actions and moral intellection towards solving it, the system of social expectation is bound to suffer transformations. However, the solution is arrived at, new expectations image which modify the whole preexisting system. It is for the reason that expectations cannot be considered as purely statical neither as simply transit, but they definitely evolutionary. This is more so as they are built on the basis of proceeding expectation which have matured in the process of social practice and the consequent reflections.

Regulatory framework for the language or cooperation

As already discussed, conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4, constitute an entirety that could very well serve as the best framework for regulation of the language of cooperation. As much as regulations could be analyzed, it is important to note that such cannot have a universal character; since their content is strongly associated to the prevailing conditions in each specific social group at a determined point in the time. This means that they can only be considered as a general framework that might serve to orientate the sense of transformations. but not to establish the inexorable rules that govern or lead them.

Considering the case of our village according to the memory of the older people, the organization of the festival, at least at the initial time, was informed by the expectation that completely satisfied conditions 1 and 2. Thus, all the old people hoped that the provision of public services and benefits were efficiently managed and considered such activities as related to a joint business enterprise. On the basis of such expectations they patterned their behavior, which implies to arrive punctually in order to finish up the various activities and assignments' such as decorative tasks, which were associated with participating in the festival. Driven principally by those expectations they all committed themselves to preparing, in the best possible the meals which were consumed and endeavoured to contribute the best quality wine.

Everything seemed to be all right and if we were going to believe in the spontaneous evolution of expectations, joint strategies and the language of cooperation, it only remained to fully appreciate the next step where a waterfall leads to definitive success in cooperation; but things happened in a very different way. Many explanations could be rendered as to why a group, that naturally spoke the language of cooperation without even being confronted with problems of syntax, if off, until it finally disappeared. Undoubtedly, the hardest responsibility could be attributed to conditions 3 and 4 which were not present to normatively prop the expectations. But there were also some people, who rather attempt other explanations, such as those backed in the so called negative consequences of transiting from community to society. However, none of such explanations could on their own, answer such complex phenomenon as replacing a language with another.

If what happened in the village is taken into account, the thesis which could be developed is that linearly cumulative character of achievements in matter of social language themselves show the inherent weaknesses. Since the active exercise of a language of cooperation where conditions 1 and 2 were completely in force, could insensible end up in language of non cooperation. The same behavior could be observed in stages of inverse conditions as it was in the genesis of communal language in the post-war era in Europe. In fact, a few stages could be identified as more absent of conditions 1 and 2, as Europe after the Second War. Especially the condition opposing joint strategies to manage collective affairs which seemed hitherto, unthinkable. For instance, as unthinkable as the case of France and Germany, which had maintained a tradition of antagonism in the just ended bellicose drama. However, only a lustrum passed for such conditions to be present and that which appears most significant is in the European Community Treaty on Coal and Steel, signed in April l951. It may be observed here that conditions 3 and 4 were established tending to normatively reinforce the strategies developed in 1 and 2.

In both cases, the village and the European Union seem to have demonstrated that those conditions which make possible the language of cooperation are not produced and developed in a mechanical and lineal manner. Rather, they are a complex product of practice and use of strategies with each social group, tackling problems of production and distribution of social benefit.

If we go back to the example of our village, we can better see how these four conditions work and the relations which they keep among themselves. The first thing to see is that the four conditions are interdependent and the absence of any one of them could produce direct effect on others. Second, all of them are historical and therefore provisional, having to be permanently rejuvenated, seeing the evolution suffered by collectivity and their ethical marks of reference.

For instance, if expectation of efficient management (in any sense in which efficiency might defined) are absent, conditions 2, 3 and 4 do not make sense. This should be the case if the villagers did not accord importance to how good the festival was. Likewise, if expectations of dealing with problems through the use of joint strategies did not exist, 3 and 4 would not he enough to keep the language alive. This should be the case that led to the result of a better wine, but did not produce the restoration of the language of cooperation. Finally, if 3 and 4 are not present, 1 and 2 would not take a long time before they disappear. This is the stage that followed that unfortunate night.

The second interesting aspect is related to the contend of each condition, which in the process of change would used to be permanently updated to keep the language alive. In the example of the village, it was hoped that the whole paraphernalia of the festival, could be found useful to produce fun, in the manner considered to be social entertainment by the village standards. Naturally, in the course of time and the modification of internal and external social conditions, the content of the expectation experienced change. In spite of the opinion of nostalgia, for the young people a good discotheque wig many acoustic and dazzling laser light and neon intermittences was more useful in producing fun than a festival in honor of a Patron Saint. No matter how rules and sanctions were established, it gave the impression that new generations had perhaps assumed more enthusiastically other forms of collective interests which by their estimation could more relevantly satisfy their present expectations. This made clear on the one hand, that the definition of what might be useful, as not unequivocal nature. Rather, it entailed the resolution of conflict among diverse conceptions of what could be called efficient. Likewise, given the narrow association between conditions 1 and 2, in may cases two joint strategies that both pursue efficient resolutions are in conflict 9 If this point is analyzed at level beyond the village, it could be seen that sometime in the course of human history collective strategies were sought for granting a good life, understanding as "good life" a peaceful death. Fundamentally this confounded to the fact that a great part of the lives of people were lapsed awaiting eventual death. But today, medical and health spheres have greatly produced increases in the life span. Collective strategies are therefore directed at giving a good standard of living in a very different sense as of the former days. As a matter of fact today it may not really be fair to strongly sanction an individual's behavior that tends not to participate in the collective strategies towards betterment of standard of living in a sense as of the former days.

With regard to the contents of condition 3, the discussion about what is equitable and in what manners it could become effective, are well known issues in discussions of juridical or of political philosophy nature. It is also much debated to what extent these could tackle problems and in what circumstances they could still be useful in solving problems in an unbiased manner. There are great differences in individual circumstance, over what may be more suitable to some circumstance, may not be reasonable for others. These difficulties seem heightened by virtue of the natural evolution suffered by expectation about management and distribution of public benefits which we have earlier discussed.

With regards to the contents of condition 4, the behavioral patterns considered as fraudulent in relation to the join strategies, tend to create some perplexing results. This is due to the fact that in some cases, it is easy to characterize such behavior, but in other instances, the line of demarcation between what could be qualified as fraud and what may be deemed as mere optimal protection of individual interest is hard to draw.

Conclusions

One of the most disturbing problems and indeed quite difficult in resolving is the need to harmonize individual rationality with that of the collectivity. While the individual rationalizing rules are indicating ways of maximizing benefits without restriction, the collective point of view tilts towards the limitation of individual maximization.

Where tension exist between both approaches to rationality, and the solution favors maximizing rationality without necessarily placing restrictions, a perceptible effect is immediately produced. This is the diminution of efficiency and of the quality in the over all process of social production. This normally has a major devastating effect on the collective well being and is often regarded as the main cause of society, problems, hence the collective efforts are directed to resolve it. However, there are a number of corollary effects that seem more veiled. They are deeper and more permanent in character and get entrenched in a substantive manner into the fabric of the social existence, ending up as part of the moral language. While the first effect, which may be called manifesto, affects accruement of social benefits, the second one projects itself in a negative mode and is highly erosive on the trustworthiness and credibility of the rules of language. This constitutes the central back bone of any collective existence.

The correction of the first effect can be carried out in a successful manner through the right regulations which by means of sanctions could diminish the benefits which derivable from non restrictive individualistic maximization. These sets of sanction could also produce messages of normative worth towards the cravings for limited maximization. However, such messages rather diffusive do not have influence on the collective language in an appreciable manner.

To correct the second effect of non restrictive maximization, the process is slower and more complex. In the first place, it is necessary to keep an update on the types of relations that exist among individual expectations and the collective goal, which allows social objectives to have a reflection on individual gains from the system. In the second place it is necessary to consistently stimulate strategies which are relevant for collective use. This is not only for the purpose of producing high dividend from the collective strategies, but have in place equitable ingredients which could be useful in conflict resolution that arising from expectations which are at cross poses with one another. The mechanism would be regarded complete only when it could eliminate the instinctive attitude that from time to time arise to defraud the common good or to indulge conducts which disregard accepted agreements.

As could be seen, the process of constructing and reinforcing the language of cooperation is a task that includes a dense plot of strategies. It also targets at putting in place a culture of coherent collective will, with relevant ethics.This task may be considered too complex and minimalist, but it is important to recall that is the only efficient mechanism to return the village to its real festivity, much more than merely a place where good wine is consumed. Still more important, it is necessary to take into consideration that without being able to put the village back in festivity, the good wine will remain good for only a short while.

notes

1 As promoters for the festivity in the village social relations take the form of a full pledged cooperative game. For formalized treatments of game theory, see R. Duncan Lace and H. Raiffa (1957) and John Harsanyi (1977).

2 This illustrates the most common reasons which lead social agents to abandon cooperative behavior:

A) They believe that the collective deal is not egalitarian.
B) They regard individual rationality as unconstrained in the realization of its own possibilities.
C) The profit on terms do not fulfill their expectations.
D) The scenario of the game is no longer interesting and will be thus changed.

3 These situations constitute the background to the well known Prisoners Dilemma. I have extensively analyzed it on Barragán (1988).

4 Several authors,such as Harsanyi, maintain that cooperation is promoted only through the modification by means of punishments of the profit/loss system of the players. It turns out, however, that punishments alone are not a sufficient warrant for the inviolability of agreements when the calculus of potential inutility versus potential utility of punishments provides reasons for agreements to be violated. On this, see C.S. Nino (1991).

5 One has to bear in mind that the probability of diminishing the affects of a sanction is relatively high, especially so if the procedural warranties accepted on most western countries are taken into account. To compensate for this probability, a given sanction would have to be endowed with such a great power that only a few people would justify its application.This would also be a source of harmful consequences for those who are in disadvantage at using procedural resources.

6 See W. 13. Whitney (1989) y J.N. Hattiangadi (1987)

7 In The Evolution of Cooperation,RA. Axelrod makes the success of cooperative language to depend on the linear application of a TIT FOR TAT strategy. D. Gauthier (1986) holds a similar view.However, to make their models applicable, both authors take recourse of formal restrictions that render them outside insensitive to conflict. 8 See Barragan (1988) for a broader analysis of this topic.

9 The difficulties in integrating an individual utility functions to a collective utility function are analyzed In Scalon (1991), Griffin (1991), and Barragan (1991). Also see Griffin, Barragan, Harsanyi and Barcon (1993).

This study acknowledges an important intellectual debt owed to Prof. Barcon, J. Griffin, J. Harsanyi and E. Heymman.

This sudy has been published with permission of VENEZUELA-LAW AND ECONOMICS.

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