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The Crisis of the Judiciary System and [alternate] dipute for resolution procedures
Eva Guerón
The crisis of the Venezuelan Judiciary
In the context of the generalized questioning of the Venezuelan
political system's institutions, the judiciary has been the subject
of the most strong criticism, joined to reiterated claims for
its reform. "There is no doubt that the country needs to
face the problem of the Judiciary's loss of prestige, both from
the standpoint of its legal ability as from that of its ethics."
In effect, it is urgent to fill the gap created by the judiciary's
crisis. On one level, the crisis is the result of the courts'
overload. On another one, due to [its] high cost. On the most
important level, however, it is the consequence of the people's
mistrust of the legal system..
One must "reduce the parties" costs and loss of time
provide accessible forums
facilitate the quick resolution
of disputes being damaging to the community or to the families'
lives
increase public satisfaction with the judiciary
promote solutions being fit to the parties' needs [and] increase
the rate of voluntary complying
teach the public to test
processes being more efficient than violence or litigation to
settle their differences
[and] restore the influence of
neighborhood and local values, and community cohesion". It
becomes also indispensable that the low income sectors be offered,
not only flexible methods to solve disputes, but also procedures
excluding arbitrariness and authoritarianism [and] promote the
development of positive democratic attitudes and social values,
such as initiative, participation, potentiation and solidarity.
These quotations express come of the main concerns as to justice
administration in Venezuela. The remarkable thing is, however,
that the last three authors do not refer themselves to this country
but to other so dissimilar places as South Africa, the United
Sates of America and Ecuador. In fact, similar diagnoses and intents
to find alternate solutions are found in numerous societies in
all continents.
This finding does not redeem the Venezuelan judiciary. Its deficiencies
show huge proportions: lets us just recall that approximately
85% of the population lacks access to a justice that it perceives
as someone else's, as hostile, unpayable and incomprehensible;
that there are more than 20,000 prison inmates and tens of thousands
of cases awaiting sentence and that any contact with the judiciary
implies a lot of insecurity, the long delays and the high costs
-legitimate and illegitimate- caused by courts with great shortages
in human resources, materials and budget allowances, bound to
archaic procedures, mostly concentrated in Caracas, in precarious
facilities. On another set, in spite of the fact that one may
not blame the judiciary for the country's current ungovernableness,
the political consequences of the other institutions' discredit
are magnified due to the lessened credibility of the judiciary
as a trustworthy, valid and independent instance to process the
claims and the demands of the people.
But if do not wish to insinuate, as if satisfied with the fact
that it could have been worse, that the deficiencies of Venezuelan
justice represent mere differences of degree as compared with
the defects found in many other countries, I do want to suggest
that if so many judiciary systems are being questioned, then at
least some of the problems and defects that we criticize and suffer
in Venezuela one may not attribute solely to "native idiosyncrasy"
the ineptitude or corruption of judges and lawyers, the inefficacy
and inefficiency of domestic institutions and procedures or the
shortage of infrastructure and resources. What is then the reason
for the showing of so many so similar problems and concerns in
so many different places? Without discarding the influence and
imitation of schemes, it is possible to offer some ideas that
could explain why, in the most diverse countries, including many
that we perceive as models, is there a search of new procedures
to resolve disputes offering an alternative to the courts or to
the unilateral reaction, be it by means of violence or as a form
of reaction and resignation.
Judiciary systems and alternate procedures for dispute resolution
The alternate procedures as a perspective. In view of the
fact that disagreements and disputes are akin to normal cohabitation
and, accordingly, almost inevitable, traditional societies and
communities have developed procedures being consistent with their
values, to resolve disputes between their members. In this sense,
there have always been "alternate procedures" for conciliation,
mediation and arbitration on the part of families, priests or
other figures having authority or on that of the community in
its whole, aimed at avoiding both confrontations as the need to
recur to existing superior -and outside- awarding instances.
The creation and expansion of the modern State with its national
institutions and standards, the triumph of individualism, as well
as the sociopolitical transformations unlashed by the scientific-technological
revolution, did weaken or even voided the communitarian links
and, consequently, the efficacy of their peculiar modalities of
dispute resolution, The complexity, novelty and interdependence
of contemporary problems contributed to increase the motives and
opportunities for disputes. These changes increased the propensity
to go to court to resolve any kind of dispute, including those
that were settled within the most intimate family limits.
Judiciary systems, with their consubstantiated abidance to meticulous
procedures, were not able to process such a high volume and variety
of claims, leading to delays, backlogs of cases and an increase
in the cost of justice administration, both for the State and
for the individuals. The increasing costs and accompanying technicalities
of specialization and professionalization turned into obstacles
for those being affected, mostly those with scarce resources,
in a way that, in he absence of other means, an ever greater proportion
of the people lacks such access to justice.
Access to courts, besides, does not warrant justice. On the one
hand, this means that the most pure judgments issued with delay
may lose vigor and even worsen a situation of injustice. On another
hand, however, it alludes to a more fundamental concern for the
quality of judicial decisions, no matter how expedited they may
be: firs because there is abundant circumstantial evidence, on
a world level, that the weakest parties turn out typically being
disfavored in trials; second, because the very same nature of
the judgment, based on the application of a norm to determine
who is right or who is guilty, often produces decisions that do
not fit the needs of those being concerned, mostly in cases of
disputes between persons who wish to continue treating themselves
-within the family, the community or the workplace, for instance.
Litigation propitiates a style of arguing that does not lead to
the finding of solutions being able to satisfy both parties and
the decision won by one and lost by the other tends to worsen
the relationship between the parties or even to end it.
All these considerations around justice lead to the conclusion
that it is necessary to look for other alternatives -to rediscover
and adapt ancient procedures, to improve the existing ones or
to invent others. This conclusion, however, is often linked to
a more complex set of problems. The inaccessibilty of judiciary
systems, the mistrust of their procedures and the doubts on the
ability of their results do contribute to the negative perception
of political systems and governments -their inefficiency or inefficacy,
as well as their remoteness from specific needs of society and
of the individuals -with the consequent nourishing of a feeling
of impotence, of skepticism and people's apathy. This picture,
part of the "governableness crisis" being shown on a
world level, is a further justification for the creation of different
procedures for dispute resolution. These have the potential to
offer new modalities of participation to the communities and citizens
and they provide opportunity for learning and enable people to
become "co-owners" of the decisions affecting their
lives. In other words, they have the power to boost transformation,
when promoting self-esteem and individual empowerment and, at
the same time, respect for the others.
It would seem, then that in a world of most marked contrasts,
historical asynchronisms and specificities, some of the judiciary
systems' features and of the sociopolitical changes leave room
for diagnoses and some similar programmatic proposals, resulting
in what is being called the movement of Alternate Dispute Resolution
Procedures (ADRP) now being spread on a world level.
Procedures and questions.- The search for alternatives
has generated a wide array of procedures. Some of them are being
developed in free community centers depending on voluntary work;
others are being offered by non profit organizations. Some are
totally independent from the judiciary while others do maintain
close links with the courts, turning into their complementary
and even adjoined means. Perhaps the most thorough example of
this kind of relationship is the "Multiple Doors Tribunal"
based on a preliminary evaluation to send the dispute to mediation,
arbitration, a conventional trial or any of the other available
"hybrid" modalities, such as the private trial or some
sorts of arbitration, they look like ordinary courts, while others,
such as mediation, are characterized by informality, the absence
of a stiff structure and the use of criteria not being necessarily
circumscribed to a legal set of standards. Finally, some ADRPs
imply adjudging, that is to say a third party's -a judge's or
an arbitrator's, for instance- award, while others ensure that
the affected parties -and not a third party- draft their own decision
in cooperation. Even if all these variables have their explained
origin and their justification, analysts and observers do usually
concur in saying that mediation, taken in the last sense, has
the greatest potential to reach many -if not all- the objectives
that impelled the expansion of the ADRPs.
The alternative procedures and varied forms by them assumed bring
numerous questions and dilemmas and have led to extensive debates,
both among their critics and defenders, as among the very same
promoters of the "movement", on their significance and
implications, their advantages and risks: Is it a matter of privatizing
justice? Are the poor not just given second class justice and
those who can afford it, first class justice? Is there not a search
for peace at the expense of change? To what extent are the sought
objectives reached? It seems ever more evident, however, that
the answers to questions such as these depend more on the ADRPs'
instrumentation that on their intrinsic qualities and that they
effectively reduce the cost and time being required for resolution
of the disputes, they produce more satisfactory solutions for
the parties, they propitiate voluntary compliance and have the
potential to promote change in persons and communities.
The Venezuelan Judiciary system's reform projects and the ADRPs
The sharpening of the judiciary's crisis is impelling several
reform initiatives meant to overcome its notorious deficiencies.
First, there are several projects and proposals to amend the normative
frame. At the highest level, we have the proposals for constitutional
amendment related to the judiciary being reviewed by the Congress
Commission for the Amendment of the Constitution. There is a study,
also, of a reform of the Code of Criminal Procedure and of the
Organic Law of the Council of the Judiciary and other proposals
to regulate the judiciary system's operation, such as the Organic
Law of the Judiciary, the Organic Law of Judicial Career and the
Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice.
On another hand, the Judiciary's Infrastructure Support Project
being developed linked to an agreement between the Council of
the Judiciary and the World Bank starts from the bottom to the
top and puts its greater emphasis in the court's reform: a modernization
of its physical and technological infrastructure and, perhaps
most of all, the modernization and capacitation of its human resources.
One is dealing with an approach that one could call gradual but
at the same time realistically radical, since it does not call
for a constitutional nor legislative amendment, and according
to the shape it finally gets, it may a prerequisite in order that
the legal norms eventually approved may be actualized through
judicial praxis.
More recently, in view of the slowness of these initiatives and
of the skepticism as to their results, some sectors of civil society
began to promote the filing, by means of popular initiative, of
a bill of judicial emergency to face the "Judiciary's current
state of inefficiency and collapse".
There is the hope and possibility that, with work, political will
and some degree of luck, these initiatives may be able to correct
the main vices and defects of the judiciary and lead it to modernization.
However, as drawn from international experience, not even under
the best of all imaginable scenarios may one achieve an adequate
solution to the problems being faced by judiciary systems if measures
are not taken to implant and impel alternate procedures for dispute
resolution.
To this date there are some motives for optimism in this environment
but, unfortunately, too little. Although Venezuelan legislation
provides for arbitration and does not preclude mediation -under
the figure of procedural auto-composition-, it does not foster
them. In fact, these procedures have been sub-utilized in practice
and there has not been any proposal -nor even a development- for
other alternative means with the unique and most polemized exception
of the justice of the peace. Although this institution, still
under implantation process, has the potential to turn into a singular
Venezuelan contribution to the ADRPs, it has been debated and
often misinterpreted by its opponents and even by those presumably
backing it.
As to reform initiatives, the Council of the Judiciary/World Bank
project provides for technical assistance to "identify and
evaluate the effectiveness and the impact" of ADRPs and to
"evaluate alternate methods to improve access to Justice
by the poorest segment of Venezuelan society" and, in fact,
it included an exposition on "an alternative way to resolve
disputes" in one of the judges' workshops. The theme, however,
seems to have a much relegated place in the program's and its
schedule's set. It is thus possible that the opportunity could
be let go to integrate the ADRPs to this program's diverse components.
In the legislative area, I do not know if the subcommittee reviewing
the judiciary's constitutional amendment is considering the ADRPs,
but they were apparently set aside by the Legislative Commission
in the Code of Criminal Procedures draft amendment. In view of
the opposition raised by justice of the peace inside and outside
Congress, one may anticipate a lot of resistance to the proposals
incorporating alternative means in any amendment to the judiciary's
legislative frame. At the same time, the fact that there is justice
of the peace leads to think that resistance may be overcome.
The promoters of the judiciary emergency bill, who believe the
opposite, include among their objectives "the widening of
alternative justice in order that there will be ever more arbitration,
justice of the peace, and measures substituting deprivation of
freedom." Aside from this initiative's validity, opportunity
or feasibility, one should note that, apparently, it assigns more
importance to the ADRPs than other reform projects do.
Currently, accordingly, signs begin to appear of some interest
for alternative procedures in Venezuela. They are just slight
signs within the set of proposals to face the judiciary's crisis.
Let us hope that the recognition of the ADRPs is not postponed
until it is too late -until we realize, deceived by another unfulfilled
promise, that it is not enough to have a modern infrastructure,
nor even honest judges if we still must search for new solutions.
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