The Caldera-Samper meeting

As soon as the US government made it public that it had canceled the Colombian President's visa, intense action began at the Palace of Nariño, recommending immediate follow-up to three interview requests with President Samper, that had been made by Venezuelan media and that were on hold for a couple of weeks. The President granted interviews to El Nacional and to El Universal and Venevision, and during them he announced his intention of traveling to Venezuela, to meet with President Rafael Caldera. Officially óthrough regular channelsó, however the Colombian Government did not make any official request to hold a presidential meeting, as we understand.
On July 20, on the occasion of the presidential address to the Congress of Colombia, Samper announced his plans to intensify the fight against drug trafficking, to set the country's economy on course and to deepen social programs. There were no references to Venezuela in hid address, but, however, a report by the Office of the Security Council, presented to Congress, had most direct references to Venezuela that Venezuelan political and military establishments deemed offensive, among them those related to the sales of weapons to guerrilla groups by allegedly corrupt members of our country's armed forces.

With this background, there came the trip to Caracas, on July 28 and 29, by the new Colombian Foreign Minister, Maria Emma Mejía, organized under short notice. Several interpretations were drawn around this trip and it was said in political and newspaper media that the lady Minister, a social communicator and climbing politician had come to organize the meeting between Presidents Caldera and Samper. Prior to President Caldera giving any public opinion, or Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas doing the same, a series of comments were expressed against President Samper's visit, resulting both from the interpretation of his already famous address to Congress, and from the ever more deteriorating Colombian political situation, where Samper plays a decisive role as a consequence of judicial case number 8,000 investigating the links of drug traffic to Colombian politics.
The issue of Samper's visit was on the agenda of the Mejía-Burelli conversations. There were leaks indicating that the Venezuelan Foreign Minister had told his colleague that the climate was not favorable for this meeting and that it would be advisable to start with contacts at the Ministers' level, as it was held in a note by Venezuela Analítica prior to this meeting. On another hand, we did get to know that President Caldera had shown his unease at the action by President Samper when he attended a public meeting to welcome Colombian peasants who had been thrown out the Perijá mountains by the Venezuelan army because not only were they there as illegal aliens but also growing poppies. Samper promised them land and housing.
Samper's government tried to force his visit and the technical stop made at the Maiquetía airport on Tuesday July the 26, was construed as an effort to make President Caldera drive down to greet him, thus enabling him to show himself to the world as still having his main neighbor country's doors wide open to him. For the Venezuelan government, the decision to receive or not the important transit passenger, must have been quite difficult. On the one hand, there were factors making such presidential meeting advisable, but on another hand, there are factors and circumstances leaning the balance towards the opposite side. There was no easy decision.
Among the first factors one could mention the reaffirming of an independent policy and of Latin American solidarity; it would have been a good occasion to raise to a presidential level the most important issues of the bilateral agenda that have not been duly attended to. After all, we were dealing with the Head of State of a neighbor country requiring the maintenance and production of a permanently fruitful relationship.
Among the reasons making it inadvisable to have the technical stop it is worth mentioning the publicly adopted postures of political organizations, among them the Copei and AD parties who did not favor the visit. The AD National Executive Committee's spokesman, Arístides Hospedales, announced that this party thought it was not convenient to have this summit as long as the multiple binational commissions that are reviewing the problems between Venezuela and Colombia do not have concrete definitions as to these issues. On his side, Copei's Secretary General, Donald Ramírez, held that it was advisable to postpone the Caldera-Samper meeting, in view of the fact that Colombia is under a critical conjuncture and also because there is no political climate in Venezuela for this meeting.

Other political leaders pronounced themselves also against the summit and it seem as if we reached a public opinion crystallization point around this issue, unfavorable for the most. Curiously, some Senators, members of the Foreign Policy Committee, at a meeting held with Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas, expressed their favorable criterion for the meeting, under several premises: not having it would be playing the United States' game; the media magnified the incident related to the July 20 presidential address, putting in Samper's mouth words he had not said.
Some analysts think that if the meeting is to be held, under the circumstance, its effectiveness would be limited as concerns Venezuela, since the cost-benefit ratio would favor Samper. The meeting, without any preparation, without an agenda, most certainly would have been a photo opportunity for Samper. It is obvious that Caldera is bound to meet with Samper, o with whoever takes his place; the meeting is something advisable, but it must be whenever it suits better bilateral interests. For the time being we have a situation with some bitter after taste ócertainly not that of the Angostura bitters, the liquor prepared by the descendants of Doctor Siegler from the times when the Liberator used to visit the land of Guayana.