One of these truths proposes that territorial political integration goes one way only and that status and/or class … "in modern developed world, had substituted such antique grounds of political association as ethnicity and religion". ⁽²⁾ In some ways, the ideas on which we shape up political space and that we use to qualify political institutions do come from this tradition.

Within this frame, new and renewed regional, ethnic, linguistic and religious loyalties appear which compete and interact with global totalizing perspectives. Both the first as the second reinforce the State fragmentation process, under domestic or supra-national reasons. ⁽³⁾

The following is a partial result of some thoughts on the role of the State in international relations of our times. In this context, we ask ourselves: what kind of relationship is being established between the eventual decadence of State as the political form since the seventeenth century and the need to rethink on the intellectual premises that led to political rationality, and within it to political science and to the theory of international relations?

As Sheldon Wolin says, the guidance of western political though has marked a kind of direction which is the designing of order out of political chaos, having an architectural political vision based on an imaginary reordering of political life. Thus, in the Middle Ages there was a breaking from a theological vision of politics based on the idea of God and Christ's Mystical Body, substituting it by secularization and separation between Church and politics. The main objective was to observe political reality under the ordering principles brought by rationality: Raison d'Etat, the law, secular criteria. ⁽⁴⁾

The substitution of God by Reason in politics carried on with History, the sovereign State and individual sovereignty. Slowly, a tradition began to grow, that of the autonomy of politics and political power, that of State, of man as a rational being. ⁽⁵⁾

Rupture between Church and Empire implied the abandonment of certain beliefs that had justified this process. During the High Middle Age Church and Empire were identified. Each Christian kingdom was a member of Christian society, headed by the Roman Pontiff. Thus, what was spiritual and temporal belonged to the Church, although the Pope delegated exercise of the latter in the hands of the Prince. In this sense, the Kingdom was erected around the Law, when the State began to claim its own public institutions under the concept of regia potestas, albeit always under papal auctoritas. ⁽⁶⁾ This vision began to change inasmuch as the Prince emancipated, and power began to centralize with him, with the appearance of the notions of State and citizenship tending to overcome the ideas of blood, race, language, locality and religion.

Machiaveli is a strong representation of the change from the mediaeval to Modernity. With him, political thought becomes singular, temporal and non universal; at the same time, any intermediate practice of power is subjected to central authority. ⁽⁷⁾ The intermediate step between dispersion of power and concentration in the crown, yields to the limitation of royal authority and Church and nobility privileges within the frame of French Revolution. As from that moment, the authority of kings is going to be shared with authority of the people. ⁽⁸⁾

The French Revolution marks the end of the Nation-State's stabilization process. European society, the heir to the mediaeval Christian Res publica, emerges as a consequence of the Empire and the Popedom in the Low Middle Ages, with more weight during the Renaissance and the Reform. In this way, the bifrontal model of Empire and Popedom yields to a plurality of States that do not recognize a superior entity. This is how we observe the appearance of the System of European States, as from the Peace of Westphalia, in the year 1648. ^(9). Subsequently, the System of European States became a System of World States.

In our times, a consensus is being built more strongly each day on the fact that the Nation-State as an international actor is being exhausted and that the answer given by Modern Ages to the problem of power does not suffice to understand the changes occurring within the so called international transition. In this perspective, political Realism was the intellectual proposal by excellence. In fact, "Realism is deeply seated in Western thought. If we do not understand this, we may not understand nor even criticize our tradition of thinking on international politics". ⁽¹⁰⁾

Realist tradition does generate then serious limitations to capture what is happening: transformations of global political space, the rise of multilateral and transnational actors, the appearance of alternative political practices; in a way, recreation of political life on new grounds. In this sense, a short circuit is produced between an eroding intellectual climate, that of Modernity and the disenchantment with government and the disappearance of trust in politics as a form of superior thinking. ⁽¹¹⁾ On another hand, sovereignty, the fundamental principle of Realism, turns into a problem, since the nation-State is unable to warrant it currently. The firm consequence of the former is that tradition ignored, or simply minimized, the external factors' importance when making the analysis. It thus seems paradoxical to think that emulation of the West and its basic elements, industrialization and democratization, should have so little value today.

The "guilt" for all this falls on the European experience's generalization: the urbanizing process, secularization, political participation, State, nationalism, these are all categories being inherited from modern tradition that, Marx and Freud notwithstanding, were not able to break with an ingenuous vision, that of linear development, that of the oil spot, that of Western culture's expansion, and of the belief that each country was protected by an imaginary dome. ⁽¹²⁾

It is not enough, then, to say that we are in the presence of a new phase of history. The concern is mainly to think once more on Modernity's intellectual premises. That which was considered as a permanent model is now being questioned even at its grounds and the loss of sovereignty, the rise of localisms, the States' fractures tend to become common phenomena. As soon as the State is more permeable and partially yields sovereignty to international and supranational organizations, "we look with fresh interest at previously discredited supranational strucutres like the old Habsbufg monarchy and are gaining a new appreciation of the importance of local and regional identities" ⁽¹³⁾

The system of States is contested and this is so because we are in the presence of an "internationalization of public function". the product of a deep change in capitalism. Let us recall that trade and industrial capitalism is linked to the formation of national states and the so called information capitalism is linked to their eventual disappearance as the political form by excellence. ⁽¹⁴⁾

Within this frame, one may ask if this is the degree to which the modernist resolution of space and time realtions expressed by the principle of state sovereignty offers a plausible account of contemporary political practices, including the practice of states"?⁽¹⁵⁾

If the Nation-State is losing an important part of its functions, if national economy overcomes world economy, and if we are in the presence of a supranational restructuring of the globe, the realist paradigm's modification is a necessity. In fact, the Nation-State gets to be only a portion of a greater system, the Global System. ^(16)..One must make clear, however, that this is a historical, not quite so straight and full of contradictions process. In this sense, "the extensive political change processes become complicated, mostly in view of the historical asynchronism of development processes. If, on one side countless international organizations have been created, and some States have already yielded part of their sovereignty to supranational instances -at least within the European Union-, in the Third Works, there are national States that are just being created; moreover, we are experiencing a rebirth of national claims, mostly in places where the were repressed, as it is the case with the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia." ⁽¹⁷⁾

The tendency towards the displacement of a whole constellation of States towards a fragmented international structure, made of more than 170 States and other non state actors causes Realism to prevent knowing the way to interdependence, globalization and transnationalization. On another hand, the deep interdependence between the States and the need for cooperation between them generate new problems such as, for instance, the internal policy's susceptibility to external shocks and the questioning of a permanent international anarchy's idea. As to globalization, it boosts a permanent crossing of interests which implies a constant problem for national political control.

The growing diffusion of power and the search for a new paradigm have given impulse to two perspectives of a theoretical nature: the so called controversy between Neorealists and Neoliberals, and the debate between those who proclaim the disappearance of the Nation-State and those who hope for reacommodation of their functions. ⁽¹⁸⁾

The debate between Neorealists and Neoliberals is based on three main issues: 1) the significance and implications of international anarchy for conflict and cooperation between States; 2) the problem of the gains and losses when negotiating; 3) the tension between negotiation an distribution of power. ⁽¹⁹⁾

Some realist authors understood that the old model based on the concepts of power politics and national power had to be reformulated. Thus, a new theoretical road was followed, setting aside Hans Morgenthau's proposal on the individual feature of human being, emphasizing on the importance and autonomy of the international system as opposed to the States. ⁽²⁰⁾

As a consequence, for Neorealists, globalization is the product of the reacommodation in the balance of power between States and the result of the imperfect distribution of international power and each particular State's power.

Neoliberals, on the contrary, emphasize on the study and comprehension of global changes within the frame of international economy and not on a political plane. For such reason, its is estimated that we are in the presence of a "global turbulence" where the universe of global politics is made of two interacting worlds: a multicentric world, formed by several kinds of actors being relatively at the same level, and a world of centrist States. This is what James Rosenau calls a "governance without governments…" … "regulating mechanisms in an field of action that operates effectively, without being part of a formal authority". ⁽²¹⁾

As to the role of State, two perspectives arise: multidiplomacy and paradiplomacy. Both perspectives are coincident with the fact that international relations do not present the States' exclusivity nor an absolute international anarchy. They differentiate, however as to their definition of the role of State. For multivaried diplomacy, "States keep being the main actors in world politics, but their links to transnational and sub-national actors are constantly more close and complementary." ^(22). For paradiplomacy, the proliferation of transnational and sub-national actors implies the virtual decadence and displacement of the Nation-State as the main actor in international relations.

4. The West is entering a complex reexamination period where the basis for modern thinking are being reassessed, with a proliferation of visions, paradigms and model trying to get to know the new situation. The centralized and territorial State, sovereignty, nationalism and the citizen idea are questioned, and in the international relations' environment, Realism is being exhausted with its own limitations. In this way, the intellectual climate that led to illustration -one that allowed for the domination of a real vision of politics, based on the idea of progress, the separation between State and society and on the legal domination of power- has lost its vigor.

We thus have that Realism and its vision of politics as a fight dominated the area of studies and even in our times it competes with other approaches, many of them revisions of the global approach based on State primacy, the separation of the internal and external planes, national interest and the consideration of power as the central variable. Within this frame, … "Raison d'Etat, jointly with the rationalization of state structure, achieved by juridical legal order, that is to say rationally formulates and with general validity (as opposed to the mosaic of customs' right) and with the organization of Government bureaucracy, where public functions are spread within competencies rigorously established by law, did strongly contribute to objectivate State…" ⁽²³⁾

The globalization process has given impulse to modification of Realism. In fact, the Nation-State belongs to a recent period of history and, as a consequence… "the appearance of international organizations and other non Government agents, including specially terrorist and revolutionary movements, the expansion of transnational contacts and the independence notions, have created a new set of dimensions in international relations." ⁽²⁴⁾

This does not mean that we are in the presence of a definite disappearance of the Nation-State as the main actor in international relations. We are talking of a long process forcing us to analyze the complex network of actors and relationships in a globalized world under most varied elements, something going beyond the suppositions of Realism and, generally, of the approach to rationality.

We find ourselves, then, between two essentially transnational eras, the mediaeval one and that about to arrive, the post-statist one.

NOTES

1) In: Nevil Johnson., Los Límites de la Ciencia Política. Madrid, Tecnos, 1989.

2) See: Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr; Robert J. Thompson., Política Etnoterritorial. Barcelona, Ediciones Pomares- Corridor, S.A, 1992, p.9

3) In: John Kinkaid., "Constitutent Diplomacy in Federal Policies and the Nation States: Conflit and Cooperation". In: Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos., Federalism and International Relations. The Role of Subnational Units. Oxford, ClarIndon Press, 1990, pp. 54-76 (p. 56)

4) Sheldon Wolin., Politics and Vision.New HalIn, Yale University Press, 1960. Manuel García Pelayo., La Idea de la Política. Caracas, Cuadernos de la FundaciÛn Manuel García Pelayo., n_ 1, 1993.

5) In: R.B.J Walker., Inside/Outside. International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 31

6) In: Ernst H. Kantoriwicz., The King's Two Bodies. A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.

7) R. B. J Walker., Op. Cit, p.62,

8) See: Reinhard Bendix., La Razón Fortificada. Ensayos sobre el Conocimiento Social. México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1975

9) In: Antonio Truyol y Sierra., La Sociedad Internacional. Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1974

10) In: Wolfgang Hein., "El Fin del Estado- Nación y el Nuevo Orden Mundial. Las Instituciones Políticas en Perspectiva". Nueva Sociedad, n_ 132, pp. 83-99, (p. 87)

11) Robert Nisbet., Historia de la Idea del Progreso. Barcelona, Gedisa, 1991

12) See: Reinhard Bendix, Op. Cit, p. 17

13)John H. Elliott., National and Comparative History. An Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before The University of Oxford on 10 May 1991. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991

14) In: Wolfgang Hein., Op. Cit.

15) R. B. J Walker., Op. Cit, p. 30

16) Eric J. Hobsbawn., Nations and Nationalism. Cambridge, Canto, Cambridge University Press, 1991

17) In: Wolfgang Hein, Op. Cit, p. 88

18) See: Robert Powell., "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate". In: International Organization. Vol. 48, n_ 2. Spring, 1994, pp. 313-344

19) Barry Buzan., "From International System to International Society. Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School". International Organization, Vol. 47, n_ 3, Summer 1993, pp. 327-352

20) In: Hans Morgenthau., La Política entre las Naciones. La Lucha por el Poder y por la Paz. Buenos Aires, GEL, 1986.

21) James Rosenau., "Governance without Government". In: James N. RosInau, Ernst Otto Czempiel., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992. See also: James N. Rosenau., TurbulInce in World Politics. A Theory of Change And Continuity. New York, Harverter-Wheat Sheaf, 1990.

22) In: Brian Hocking., Localizing Foreign Policy. London, Mac-Millan, 1993

23) In: Manuel García Pelayo., La Razón de Estado y Otros Escritos. Antología del Pensamiento Político. Giovanni Botero. Vol. III. Estudio Preliminar. Caracas, IEP-UCV, 1962, (p.51).