Our conflicting perspective of the United States has been that of an internal democracy and an external empire: Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. We have admired the democracy. We have deplored the empire. And we have suffered its actions, the constant intervention with our lives in the name of the manifest destiny and the big stick, the dollar diplomacy and the cultural arrogance.

The truth is that as from 1993, when the U.S. government called for the Americas Summit, to this day, expectations as to the rebuilding of hemispheric relations have been changing at an accelerated pace. Altering Fuentes' metaphor, I think that it is ever more evident from the Latin American point of view that both the domestic as the foreign policy of the United States carry the duplicity described by Robert Louis Stevenson in The strange case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.

I must say that by reading a recent work of the respected U.S. Latin American specialist Howard J. Wiarda (Latin American Politics, Belmont Ca: Wadsworth, 1995) I have been pushed to think over and to reevaluate Dr. Jekyll's enormous potential in this historical context, and at the same time to reflect on what we may do to neutralize Mr. Hyde from Latin America.

Dr. Jekyll:
The expectations of a new hemispheric relationship
In spite of the enormous global and hemispheric transcendence of the world's strategic, sociopolitical and economic changes, and of the shaking they have implied for the United States' position, foreign policy was a deliberately and clearly absent issue during the electoral campaign that took the Clinton-Gore team to Government, under the premise that there were domestic problems claiming for priority care. Subsequently, the weight of hard to attend problems and promises joined an environment of growing distancing towards the international something deepened with the 1994 congressional elections, with the announcement of the "Agreement with America" and the almost immediate process of preliminary Republican candidacies, among other events reinforcing this state of mind.

Even under this climate and the criticism of a lack of clear foreign policy definitions, it is important to recall that the Clinton administration kept dealing with issues of undoubted international projection and interest. The end of intervention in Somalia; the adoption of NAFTA; the financial assistance to the recently elected government of Ernesto Zedillo in Mexico; the continued backing of peace negotiations in the Middle East; the normalization of relations with Vietnam; the closing of negotiations and the adoption of agreements at GATT's Uruguay Round; the calling for the Miami Summit and the approval of a Statement of Principles and an Action Plan at a hemispheric level; the negotiations for NATO's expansion; the search for trade agreements with Japan; intervention in Haiti; the impulse to English-Irish negotiations; and the commitment with peace negotiations between Bosnians, Serbs and Croatians, including the sending of troops jointly with NATO partners. Towards the end of 1995, President Clinton traveled to Europe where he participated in the definition of a new Atlantic Agenda and in giving new impulse to peace talks in Northern Ireland. These steps were construed as a turn in Clinton's foreign policy, who thus came closer to his initial enlargement and engagement orientations, in contrast with the reduction of presence and international commitment associated to isolationism's reappearance.

A list such as this is a mere indication of the inevitable level of international activity that the United States should have assumed in the post-cold-war world, even without wanting it too feverishly and even more when starting form a certain void of "master" guidelines. What has been happening, as a review in Time magazine pointed out some months ago ("Uncertain Beacon", 11-27-95: 14-19) revealing a still unresolved internal conflict: the world needs the U.S. leadership and the U.S. citizens seem to be interested in providing it with regard to a reduced range of issues.

It is not a matter of denying that President Clinton has challenged a prevailing vision of mistrust towards the world and of concentration on domestic issues, as he did with his commitment to NAFTA's adoption, with the military mission to Haiti, with the financial assistance to Mexico, and with the decisive support to peace negotiations in former Yugoslavia.

On another hand, as to the United States' role and their ability to influence world events, there is an acknowledgment of this ability to influence, in the priorities that, according to a recent poll, the U.S. citizens define for foreign policy: To stop the flow of illegal drugs; to protect North American jobs; to prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons; to control illegal immigration; and to guarantee secure energy supply.

These concerns, precisely, even with all their domestic bias, are the starting point to argue on the impossible return to the traditional concept of isolationism, and to observe the fatality of interdependence. The United States may not be isolated from world reality: their trade -in energy particularly-, the financial, environmental, demographic and sociopolitical links with the world make of isolationism something too costly and risky. This brings about an enormous challenge, not yet seriously faced, in spite the numerous reflections on the new role of the United States in the turbulent war following the end of the cold war: The challenge of strategic and tactical innovation to influence transformations at a world level for its own benefit -within that of its specific principles and objectives,. This implies a new definition and/or reinforcing off coalitions and cooperative security mechanisms around the regions and issues requiring -in growing number and complexity- global attention.

The Americas Summit that finally took place in Miami in December 1994, was precisely a most important intent to redefine hemispheric agendas and strategies in relation with such important issues as the preservation and strengthening of democracy (that included human rights, fight against illegal drug problems and against corruption and terrorism, and measures to reinforce mutual trust), economic integration and free trade, elimination of poverty and discrimination, and finally, the guarantee of a sustainable development and the preservation of the environment. This set of issues was able to establish a healthy link between domestic and global concerns of the thirty four participants.

Thus, what is characteristic in Dr. Jekyll is the search for new formulas and spaces for hemispheric coordination, perceiving the huge ambiguity of the global situation and the United States' vulnerability facing it, under a responsible attitude and with conscience of the power of the "elephant in the crystal shop."

Mr. Hyde:
Decreasing expectations.
Alex Hybel. the U.S. analyst has rightfully observed in his book Power Over Rationality, The Bush Administration and the Gulf Crisis (New York, Suny, 1993) that the perception of the United States' invulnerability -particularly in the post-cold-war period- has turned into a considerable hurdle opposing the quality of the decisions that a power requires in a moment such as this. This vision,. notes Hybel, is accompanied by the perception of domestic vulnerability, and that just leaves space for foreign policy initiatives strongly led by domestic policy imperatives and opinion currents. This has been accentuated, naturally, during the electoral period, as evidenced in the hemispheric issues that have brought attention for the last months: the cooling of the free trade issues' discussion, the hardening of Cuba's blockade, and the relationship with Colombia.

Of course, quite diverse events that we are not called to judge here under their specificity -the Chiapas insurrection in January 1994, the Mexican financial crisis and the tequila effect since late 1994, the "narco-casettes" and the "process 8,000" in Colombia, the shooting of the "Hermanos al Rescate" [Brothers to the Rescue] planes by the Cuban Air Force in March 1996- raised most energetic responses and even important turns in President Clinton's initial attitude, as it is the case with the Helms-Burton Act.

The revealing feature of Mr. Hyde is then his self-perception of international invulnerability, his tendency towards unilateralism, the wrong appreciation of global complexity and interdependence, the projection of his internal vulnerability to the world, and the short conscience of his liability -by action or omission- in configuring world processes.

Notwithstanding their not binding nature, the terms of the approved programmatic proposal during what some have called the "Buchanan Convention" are good indicatives of the above described attitude.

From Latin America:
The search for alliances with Dr. Jekyll
In spite of the unease produced among Latin Americans when dealing with Dr. Jekyll / Mr. Hyde, the reasons having boosted the new hemispheric dialog in Miami are still in force.

On the one side, Latin America is an increasingly more important region for the United States. As a matter of fact, the above quoted text by Howard J. Wiarda -one that should be read by many U.S.… and Latin American citizens- offers an excellent analysis of the reasons calling, in the post-cold-war era, for more highly placed relationship between the United States and Latin America. Wiarda insists on the fact that the development of a positive, cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship is not an idealist project; what is more, it is in the interest of the United States to give more and better attention to Latin America and to the formation of an integrated hemispheric space. The specific areas of interest for the United States are: democracy; the new complementation environments; oil; issues of the new interdependence agenda; Mexico, as a most sensible interlocutor; and the opening of markets.

On another hand, the United States keep being a fundamental interlocutor for Latin America, not only by virtue of the global significance of trade and financial relations, but also because of the attractive nature of the strategic prospect of building an integrated hemispheric zone.

If we review with some caution the reasons exposed in detail by Wiarda and if we analyze them from or own perspective we will find, without great difficulty, a wide zone for complementing interests.

Democracy.
Transitions to democracy in Latin America -although still incomplete- define a wide platform of common interests in the promotion of favorable conditions for the defense of human rights, of the rule of law, and of democracies having effective and responsible participation. This requires, of course, that promotion of democracy be seen under different "lenses" than those used in the past, since Wilson and until Bush. Democracy is not a problem of security in the traditional sense, it is indeed with reference to this hemisphere's sociopolitical and economic stability; accordingly, it is not either an achievement being consolidated through more or less open elections, it is rather a permanent transition process requiring intensive work in its domestic and global conditioning factors.

Complementary economic interest.
Beyond the attraction of the mere "size" of a hemispheric trade association, there are qualitative reasons to seriously think about this prospect. By virtue of the already existing economic relationship, one that makes important trade partners of us, there is an interdependence reality that -its asymmetry notwithstanding- is an advantageous starting point. Both the high rate of Latin American exports to the United States (more than 40%) as the increasing significance of Latin American markets for this country (Chile is more important than India, and Costa is more than Eastern European countries), are indicators of this economic space's current importance and potential.

Opening of markets.
The reorientation of Latin American economies, a result of the adjustment and reform policies, is still at its half way; we may say also that transition to democracy is incomplete. Each country's sociopolitical and economic health as well as the future of regional and hemispheric economic associations depend, also, on these programs' success. If these policies are to succeed, there must be first a consistent and efficient domestic effort and full opening external environment where -in view of the existing relationship's weight- the United States' conduct and policies have a decisive impact. Finally, for the good of the whole hemisphere, within the context of a global economy, the success of the market openings must be measured in terms of political and economic stability.

The new interdependency's agenda.
Both for the United States as for Latin America, the new hemispheric agenda is at the same time domestic and a matter of foreign policy. The international borders' porosity is something more than a concrete empirical reference: It is a metaphoric representation of the link between national and hemispheric scenarios, in a way that poverty, economic standstill, political instability, production-traffic-and-use of illegal drugs, are "domestic-global" problems. Hence, to the image of the elephant in the crystal shop one should add the greater perturbation that may be created by the movement of little mice. The secret lies in reinforcing the "positive interdependencies" opposing the "negative" ones.

In view of the wide zone of complementary interests, and even under the conviction that a new hemispheric relationship is a necessity and not just an idealistic raving, the challenge still is: How may one reinforce Dr. Jekyll's conducts? How may one promote a new cooperation formula from both sides?

Two respectable U.S. analysts -Mark Falkoff and Peter Hakim- have coincided in pointing out recently that, after November 1996, with a newly elected President. hemispheric free trade -and with it Latin America- will recover its U.S. foreign policy agenda. I believe, however, that it will not happen automatically and that, even if it were so, it would not be sufficient to build the hemispheric relationship we need to enter the third millennium with the right step.

We must retrace, from the Latin American side, our relationship with the United States under the terms required by the new global context. We may contribute to neutralize Mr. Hyde by means of domestic and foreign policies reinforcing regional coordination and limiting the scarce rationality resulting from our invulnerability, making us more responsible and committed with the handling of regional problems, and making us more assertive and efficient in our collective positions and offers.

Beyond the international relations' traditional perspective, me must seek alliances with Dr. Jekyll. The formula is to promote links between interlocutors who, in Latin America and in the United States, share this other vision of hemispheric relations. We find this in the government and non government networks dealing with issues having a potential for coordination and complementation and, most specially, in academic circles and analysts producing what has been called "politically relevant knowledge", that is to say a specific knowledge on Latin America, on the United States, on each one's agenda and that of the hemisphere, and on the new strategies to build a health and auspicious hemispheric policy.