Jonathan Rosemberg Kort(*)

"Article 1. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is irrevocably free and independent and supports its moral patrimony and liberty values, equality, justice and international peace, according to the doctrine of Simon Bolivar, the Libertador. Independence, liberty, sovereignty, immunity, territorial integrity and national self-determination are mandatory rights." (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, Constitución Bolivarina de Venezuela, 1999)

The above statement could very well be Venezuela’s biggest step toward democracy in over thirty years –whether it is a step forward or backward, the reader will decide.

In December, 1998, Venezuela was victim to one of the most incredible and intense political events of the century: Mr. Hugo Chavez Frias’, "el comandante", rise to power. Since Mr. Chavez became president of the nation, history has been changing its course for the twenty three million Venezuelans who are to learn of Chavez’s "policy of the day".

Hugo Chavez Frias is the strong leader of what he calls "the peaceful revolution". In the following paper I have decided to explain the major change Mr. Chavez’s peaceful revolution is trying to accomplish, a new constitution, and why he should be stopped. In order to do this, I have divided this essay in three different parts: first, a brief biography about the new president, in which I have also included information regarding his rise to power; second, a thorough description, analysis and critique of excerpts from the new constitution and its implications to Venezuela’s future; and finally, a short conclusion that includes my personal opinion as a Venezuelan citizen.

Hugo Chavez Frias was born in Sabaneta, Barinas State on July 28^th, 1954. His parents were both schoolteachers and, after he finished high school, they decided to send him to Venezuela’s Military Academy, where he graduated with a degree in Military Sciences and Arts. In 1982 he founded the Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement. During 1989-1990, he studied Political Science at Simon Bolivar University in Caracas.

He led an unsuccessful military coup against President Carlos Andres Perez on February 4^th, 1992, that launched him onto the political scene and, at the same time, earned him two short years in what he refers to as the "prison of dignity".

While Chavez was in prison, he videotaped a call for insurrection that was broadcasted at around four in the morning on November 27^th, 1992, when a second unsuccessful coup d’etat was attempted. "For the second time in ten months, renegade Venezuelan soldiers have tried to overthrow the elected government of elected President Carlos Andres Perez. […] In dogfights between loyalist and rebels, several aircraft were shot down. […] more than 230 people died in the violence […]", reported a special correspondent for The Economist from Caracas. (The Economist, 1992, pp. 46)

He was pardoned two years later by President Caldera.

Once Chavez was released from his conviction, he started to organize a political party called the Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento Quinta República, MVR) which would lead him to power four years later. In November, 1998, a coalition of small leftist parties led by the MVR and under the umbrella of the Patriotic Pole won 34% of the seats in the National Congress and presented Chavez as its presidential candidate. After campaigning as "the scourge of the oligarchy and the champion of the poor", Chavez came out victorious from the 1998 Presidential Elections with an astounding 56% of the votes –the largest majority in four decades. (Kaleidoscope, 1999)

"A populist leader backed by leftist parties, Chavez has advocated a ‘third way’ between communism and capitalism", wrote Patrick Moser for the Agence France Presse earlier this year. "The former colonel", he continues, "likes to spice his often lengthy and unusual speeches with quotes from the Bible, French poets, military overtones and repeated references to South America’s independence hero Simon Bolivar, who [he] claims his inspiration". (Agence France Press, 1999)

Chavez’s election also resulted on the collapse of the two-party system that had protected the interests of the rich for the past forty years, which was composed by Democratic Action (Acción Demócratica, AD) and the Christian Socialist Party (Comisión de Organización Política Electoral Independiente, COPEI). Since his ascent to power, along with the downfall of the major political parties, a large number of institutions have also been stripped from their authority, reduced to nothing or dissolved (including the National Congress). The disappearance of many traditional organizations (corrupt or not) that safeguarded Venezuela’s democracy threatens its stability and diminishes the meaning and importanceof civil society.

Due to Mr. Chavez’ extraordinary popularity and strong hold on power, the risk of the resurgence of a military and authoritarian regime is quite real. Latin America has seen, in repeated occasions, political leaders casting off their nationalist pretenses and evolving into totalitarian despots.

Regardless of whether the new caudillo-democrat president will become Latin America’s next Juan Peron or not, Venezuela’s Constituent Assembly, the most powerful legislative body, is comprised of 131 members, from which 96% are Chavez loyalists, giving him tremendous decision-making power. The Constituent Assembly has been Chavez’s most useful tool to accomplish his peaceful revolution.

Created by Chavez mainly to draft a new constitution and take over the functions of the Congress during the transition process, the Constituent Assembly is nothing more than the institutionalized representation of his ideologies. The organization has provided the president with the grounds necessary to centralize power and destroy the federation. The best example of this is the "Bolivarian" constitution, which will be discussed later on in the paper.

The main characters in Chavez’s crusade are Alfredo Peña, Arturo Miquelena, Marisabel de Chavez, his wife, and wide variety of characters belonging to left and right wing political coalitions, former military officers, etc. Some people doubt how cohesive his group will prove after the December 15^th referendum to approve or dispose the newly designed constitution.

Hugo Chavez is not Latin America’s only ex-officer president. Hugo Ban-Zer, Bolivia’s 1971-1978 dictator, was also elected president in 1997 –and he apologized for his past regime’s misdeeds.

Changing the Fate of a Country

"In a victory speech delivered from the balcony of the presidential palace –flanked by the newly-elected [member of the Constituent Assembly] Marisabel- Mr. Chavez said that the new constitution would incorporate two [new] powers […] an electoral power, derived from the will of the people [and] a moral one, to fight Venezuela’s pervasive corruption, derived from God." (The Economist, 1999)

On November 1999, the final draft of what could be, in the near future, Venezuela’s new constitution was released to the public. If, on December 15^th, Venezuelans vote Yes, the old 1961 Constitution will be replaced with a new version designed according to President Chavez’s doctrines. It was elaborated (or edited) in roughly three months by twenty committees, comprised of 131 men and women that have no constitutional expertise, but are instead political neophytes.

The Constituent Assembly was accepted in a referendum organized by the National Electoral Council in April 1999. After 35% of the Venezuelan population voted Yes, a ballot was organized for the population to vote on those who today sit in the Assembly –located in the same room where the dissolved Congress used to meet. "The Patriotic Pole organized a huge voter-education drive, passing out millions of cribsheets telling supporters which of the more than 1,100 candidates to back. […] Opposition candidates outnumbered those of the Patriotic Pole by ten to one, diluting the anti-Chavez vote." (The Economist, 1999)

It is no secret that there is no organized opposition in the Venezuelan political environment. It seems as if the old political elite is in a state of shock and has not been able to coordinate efforts to object Chavez desires of absolute power. There is no such thing as democracy without opposition.

On the other hand, despite the lack of structure, individual attempts to criticize and condemn Chavez’s government have been made. In the past two weeks articles and essays have started to proliferate aiming to inform the Venezuelan public of the damage that the new constitution would cause to society.

Most constitutions have between 100 and 200 different articles stipulating rules and norms for the country. The new Venezuelan constitution contains 350, 98 more than the old one. Too many rules, no system to enforce them.

At the general level, the Bolivarian Constitution would support and legitimate ridiculous concentration of power on the executive branch of government. It would give President Chavez an extended period of six years to govern and a new clause with the option of reelection (never seen before in Venezuela’s democratic history). Chavez would be able to consolidate an authoritarian government with a legal disguise, necessary in today’s new globalized world where the respect for democratic values is the key to good international relations. (Carlos Sabano, 1999)

To this nonsense we can also add the absurd idea of changing Venezuela’s name to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, in honor of Simon Bolivar, Chavez’s indisputable hero. The process would take over five years and cost billions of bolivars that could very well be used to better Venezuela’s current economic crisis.

Here are some specific examples of how the constitution threatens democracy at its basic level.

Article 58. Truthful information. The adjective "truthful" implies control. A democratic society is characterized by freedom of expression, unrestricted and unlimited. Government controls over the facts that become available to the public is a direct attack to a sovereign society.

Article 102. Education is a human right and a fundamental social duty, it is democratic, free and compulsory. The State assumes it as a unavoidable function […]. This article puts the State in charge of education and, therefore, represents the disappearance of private institutions (because they will not be allowed to charge fees). The government would be in charge of assigning budgets to all and, therefore, it would be able to manipulate not only the information to be imparted, but also the people who would receive it.

Article 106. Every person […] can establish and maintain educational institutions under the strict inspection and supervision of the state, after receiving the necessary permits. The government would not only control the actual information taught in classrooms, but it would also "inspect and supervise" any decisions or initiatives taken by the "private" institutes.

Article 119. Indigenous Peoples’ Laws. In this section, the new constitution grants slightly less than fifty percent of the national territory to two percent of the population. The absurdity of this law would originate even more obstacles to Venezuela’s economic development and, in the future, it would undoubtedly create social issues and confrontation between the rest of the population and the indigenous tribes.

Article 236. President’s Attribute to Dissolve the National Assembly. This article describes the right of the country’s president to dismiss the National Assembly (replacement for the old National Congress), which would grant complete and uncontested power to the executive or, in fewer words, an authoritarian government.

Article 329. Control & Supervision of Armed Forces. In this section the constitution provides members of the Armed Forces with the right to vote (making it a politicized institution) and gives the president the right to promote and demote officers. Having Armed forces with political power, led by officials hand-picked by the president, increases the risks of a militarized government that would terminate democracy.

To summarize, the text itself is inapplicable: it assumes that the State has almost unlimited resources, an efficient administration and a rapidly growing economy (non-of which are real). To top this, the pamphlet does not allow a free market or society in which private initiatives can freely grow and develop. The limitations imposed by the new laws restrain even more the possibilities of development and support a one-man government that cannot be considered democratic.

Conclusions

Hugo Chavez Frias’ rise to power represents the appetite for change of the Venezuelan people. As in many Latin American countries, society expects a miracle from a "messiah", in this case Chavez, who promises change. History has taught us that in order for a change to occur, a revolution must take place. In Peru, Fujimori used tanks. In Venezuela Chavez is using his popularity.

"Chavez loves his country above all", said Dr. Kort, a renowned Venezuelan psychologist, when interviewed. "He means well, however he lacks the methodology to achieve his goal."

Today, people are starting to realize that transformations do not occur overnight. Social unrest is once again taking the streets of Caracas. A few days ago two women were criticizing the upcoming referendum in a bus in downtown Caracas. A man sitting behind them listened to their conversation and, disagreeing with their opinion, jumped on top of one of them and started clouting her until he was stopped by some of the other passengers. Headlines like this very seldom appear in Venezuelan newspapers. (El Nacional, 1999, A4)

Venezuela’s problems do not lay on the constitution. The country needs strong, constructive and positive leaders, not individualistic governments that most likely will become tyrannical dictatorships. The need for a revolution and for a newly restructured system cannot be denied, but one man cannot do it alone. It is possible that Chavez will guide the country towards a better future, but he must first review his strategy and adapt it to the Venezuelan reality.

• CROVATO, Eduardo. Letter to XXXXX. November, 25^th, 1999.

• ECONOMIST, The. The Economist Newspaper, Ltd. (U.S. and U.K. editions), 1992-1999.

• FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST. Facts on File Inc., 1989-1990.

• GIUSTI, Roberto. Un Articulado Excesivo Hace Inviable la Constitución. El Nacional, October 31^st, 1999.

• MOSER, Patrick. Agence France Presse. International News Section, July 24^th, 1999

• NEWSWEEK. Newsweek Atlantic Edition, 1999.

• O’DONOGHUE, Patrick J. Venezuela’s 1999 Constitution. News Editor, www.Vheadline.com, November 24^th, 1999.

• RODRIGUEZ ITURBE, José. El Golpe por Cuotas. Received by e-mail, April 24^th, 1999.

• SABANO, Carlos. La Constitución de Chavez. www.analitica.com, 1999.

• SALAS ROMER, Enrique. La Asamblea Liquida a Gobernadores, Destruye la Economía y pide Paciencia. www.analitica.com, 1999.

• WASHINGTON TIMES, The. News World Communications Inc., 1999.

• http://www.analitica.com/

• http://www.arranca.com/voteno/

• http://www.el-nacional.com/

• http://www.eud.com/

• http://www.vheadline.com/

• Interview with Dr. Felicitas Kort, Clinical Psychologist in Caracas, Venezuela.

• Articles (English) related to the subject.

• Articles (Spanish) related to the subject.

• Excerpts of the new Bolivarian Constitution.

(*)E-mail:jrosem@sprint.ca

Home | Miembros de la ANC | Entrevistas | Opinión  | Prensa Internacional | Prensa Nacional | Nueva Constitución | Constitución Bolivariana | Constitución de 1961 | Proyectos de Constitución | Documentación | Sitios de Interés